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Abstract 
Boredom is almost universally regarded as a dysphoric mental state, characterised by features such as 
disengagement and low arousal. However, in certain quarters (e.g., Zen Buddhism), boredom is seen 
as potentially having great value and even importance. The current study sought to explore boredom 
through a case study involving introspective phenomenology. The author created conditions in which 
he would experience boredom for an hour, and recorded his experience in real-time using a variant of 
the Experiencing Sampling Method. The data were analysed using an adaptation of Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis. The results indicated that the state of boredom contained three main 
sources of value: (a) altered perception of time; (b) awakened curiosity about the environment; and (c) 
exploration of self. Consequently, the paper offers a re-appraisal of boredom, suggesting that rather 
than necessarily being a negative state, if engaged with, boredom has the potential to be a positive and 
rewarding experience. 
Keywords: boredom; meditation; phenomenology; introspection; wellbeing. 
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The problem of boredom 
Boredom is almost universally regarded as a negative mental state. This disparaging appraisal is 
reflected in Vogel-Walcutt et al.’s (2012, p.90) definition of it as ‘temporary feelings of low-arousal 
and unpleasant emotions induced by environmental factors,’ and in Fisherl’s (1993, p.396) depiction 
as an ‘unpleasant, transient affective state, in which the individual feels a pervasive lack of interest.’ 
However, these sparse definitions do not really begin to capture the range of dysphoric feelings that 
have historically been associated with the term ‘boredom’ (Toohey, 1988). Indeed, Toohey suggests 
that boredom – or non-English translative equivalents, since ‘boredom’ did not enter the English 
language until 1852 with Charles Dickens’ (1853) Bleak House – has been used throughout history to 
depict states of malaise that involve some dispiriting combination of frustration, surfeit, depression, 
disgust, indifference, apathy, and confinement. Moreover, each historical epoch has tended to 
emphasise particular elements of this dysphoric state. One of the earliest literary works, the Sumerian 
Epic of Gilgamesh (transcribed circa 2000 B.C.) describes the Mesopotamian King Uruk as being 
‘oppressed by idleness’ (cited in Maier, 1997, p.314); this ennui is then the premise for Uruk 
embarking on a quest to discover some sense of purpose and legacy. A somewhat more frustrated 
state is depicted in Homer’s Iliad (circa 850 B.C.), in which a mood akin to boredom is cited when the 
Achaeans are waiting restlessly to fight the Trojans, with the state taking on shades of vexation and 
impatience (Toohey, 1988).  
Later, in classical Greek and Roman philosophy, we find states comparable to boredom taking 
on weighty existential overtones that verge on despair, emotional states that are arguably close to the 
modern psychiatric diagnosis of depression (Szasz, 2002). For instance, the Stoic philosopher Seneca 
(4 B.C. – 65 A.D.) lamented the ubiquity of Taedium vitae (tiredness of life), which he describes 
chillingly as ‘the tumult of a soul fixated on nothing’ (cited in Hecht, 2013, p.42); indeed, Taedium 
vitae was recognised by Roman law as one of the few morally acceptable reasons for suicide (though 
Seneca did not himself advocate this). In medieval times, boredom took on shades of spiritual 
listlessness and melancholia in the form of acedia (Latin); this was often referred to by Christians as 
the ‘demon of noontide,’ and was described by St. Thomas Aquinas (1273) as ‘sorrow of the world,’ 
and the ‘enemy of spiritual joy’ (cited in Frevert, 2011, p.31). In more recent centuries, this existential 
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sense of anomie, and of the melancholia that would often accompany it, was recast and labelled in a 
variety of ways, including as the ‘English disease’ in the 17th and 18th centuries, the ‘mal de siecle’ in 
19th century Europe, and the ‘nausea’ of continental existentialists in the 20th century (Toohey, 1988).  
Coming into the present day, contemporary psychological theory has sought to identify and 
operationalise different forms of boredom. For instance, Toohey (2011) suggests that boredom can be 
differentiated into: (a) existential boredom; (b) situational boredom; and (c) boredom of surfeit. The 
first encapsulates many of the melancholic states depicted above, such as Taedium vitae. However, as 
noted, this form of deep, existential boredom is perhaps more likely to be characterised in today’s 
medicalised discourse as ‘depression,’ and in its extreme versions to be treated clinically as a 
psychopathology (Szasz, 2002). In contrast, situational (or ‘situative’) boredom – referred to by the 
novelist Flaubert (1856) as ‘common boredom’ – arises when a specific situation is judged to lack 
interest or value. As Svendsen (2005) notes, this context-specific state can be distinguished from 
existential boredom in numerous ways, not least their physiological manifestations; situational 
boredom is revealed by signs of restlessness and/or tiredness, from fidgeting to yawning; in contrast, 
existential boredom is not necessarily accompanied by any particular physical/behavioural patterns. 
Finally, boredom of surfeit captures the kind of decadent overabundance where one encounters a lack 
of constraining limits (e.g., as experienced by the very rich), but where one also lacks the ability or 
passion to make any value distinctions, thereby finding all options to be equally uninteresting. 
Another contemporary approach to boredom, driven by psychometric personality theory, has 
been to differentiate between trait and state boredom, and to elucidate the differential factors 
comprising these. Trait boredom, i.e., general tendencies towards experiencing boredom, has most 
commonly been assessed using the ‘boredom proneness’ scale developed by Farmer and Sundberg 
(1986). Although initially operationalised as a single factor, subsequent analyses (e.g., Vodanovich et 
al.,  2005) identified two main factors: lack of external stimulation (which pertains to one’s need for 
variability and change); and lack of internal stimulation (which concerns an inability to produce 
stimulation for oneself). Conversely, state boredom relates more to what Toohey (2011) refers to as 
situational boredom, i.e., lack of interest in one’s current situation. In this respect, Fahlman et al.’s 
(2013) Multidimensional State Boredom Scale comprises five main factors: disengagement, high 
Running head: A MEDITATION ON BOREDOM 
6 
 
arousal, low arousal, inattentiveness, and (altered) time perception. In turn, both trait and state forms 
of boredom have been associated with a host of negative outcomes. For instance, trait boredom has 
been identified as a risk factor for anxiety and depression (LePera, 2011), negative social orientation, 
such as alienation or paranoia (Leong & Schneller, 1993), impulsivity (Watt & Vodanovich, 1992), 
and dysfunctional behaviours, e.g., pathological gambling (Blaszczynski et al., 1990). Similarly, state 
boredom has been linked to multiple adverse outcomes; for example, in the context of work, boredom 
has unsurprisingly been connected to greater dissatisfaction with most aspects of work, from work 
itself, to pay and co-workers (Kass et al., 2001), as well as poorer performance as rated by managers 
(Watt & Hargis, 2010). More broadly, adopting a phenomenological perspective, Bargdill (2000) 
explored more extensive forms of boredom, analysing the experiences of six people who felt ‘bored 
with their lives’ (p.188). His analysis revealed that this type of enduring malaise arose in part from an 
assessment that endeavour and action were futile, leading to feelings of apathy and emptiness.  
Re-evaluating boredom 
So, boredom is generally considered to be a problematic or dysphoric state. While there are multiple 
ways of conceptualising boredom, these all point to, in Klapp’s (1986, p.127) words, a ‘deficit in the 
quality of life.’ However, alongside this dominant negative perspective, it is possible to discern a 
subtly different strand of thought, one that is less obvious, but which actually finds some strange 
value in boredom. In this line of thinking, the issue is not so much with boredom per se, but with 
people’s inability to tolerate or engage with it. Indeed, many of the issues above, such as the 
dysfunctional gambling behaviour associated with boredom proneness, can be viewed as the result of 
a desperate fleeing from boredom; it is this common intolerance of boredom, and the resulting 
troubles, that led to the existentialist philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1843, p.281) arguing forcefully 
that ‘Boredom is the root of all evil.’ In a less dramatic way, the anthropologist Genevieve Bell (2011) 
suggests that recent technological innovations like the smartphone have created a world of constant 
distraction that prevents people from ever having to be bored. On the surface, according to the 
conventional negative appraisal of boredom outlined above, these technological developments are 
surely a good thing, alleviating its ubiquitous and problematic burden. However, Bell argues that 
actually this easy distraction is an issue, since allowing oneself to experience boredom can not only be 
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valuable, but important and vital. Indeed, she points to the emergence of trends such as ‘digital 
detoxing’ (Morrison & Gomez, 2014) as indicators that people need the time and space to 
occasionally be bored. Why might that be? What could boredom have to offer that might be of value? 
 Indeed, the impetus for the current paper stems from a similarly curious and provocative 
question by Robert Pirsig (1974) in his classic Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, in which 
he discusses the value of meditation. A wealth of recent research has suggested that meditation (e.g., 
mindfulness) can be highly beneficial for wellbeing, from alleviating mental illness (Zindel et al., 
2002) to helping people function better at work (Shapiro et al., 2005). In his book though, Pirsig 
makes a striking point in relation to the Zen practice of zazen (essentially a form of mindfulness): 
‘Zen has something to say about boredom. Its main practice of “just sitting” has got to be the world’s 
most boring activity… You don’t do anything much: not move, not think, not care. What could be 
more boring? Yet in the very center of this boredom is the very thing Zen Buddhism seeks to teach. 
What is it? What is it at the very center of boredom that you’re not seeing?’ (p317). This paper, then, 
attempts to explore this question.  
 In exploring relevant literature in pursuit of possible answers, three main responses emerged: 
(a) altered perceptions; (b) creativity; and (c) exploration of ‘the self.’ Regarding altered perceptions, 
the most striking example is shifts in one’s experience of time. Indeed, Heidegger (1938), who wrote 
extensively on the importance of becoming attuned to boredom, felt that it amounted to a physical 
experience of time (and of our existence through time). More specifically, Heidegger argued that in 
boredom – which he referred to as an ‘existential orientation’ rather than a mood (Slaby, 2010) – 
subjective time tends to slow down, as if to a halt. In a similar vein, the dissident Soviet author and 
Nobel laureate Joseph Brodsky (1997) argued that boredom ‘represents pure, undiluted time in all its 
repetitive, redundant, monotonous splendour.’ Of course, this sense of time slowing is a familiar 
feature of boredom; indeed, experiments in time perception suggest that high boredom prone people 
do experience time as subjectively passing more slowly (although they can often still accurately judge 
the objective passing of chronometric time) (Watt, 1991). However, what is striking about the position 
of Heidegger and Brodsky is the great value of entering into this altered mode of time perception. For 
instance, Brodsky described boredom as our ‘window on time’s infinity,’ the experience of which 
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could radically alter our sense of place in the cosmos. Similarly, for Heidegger, deep boredom creates 
a clearing space in which one gains insights into the nature of reality, including the sense that one is 
responsible for creating meaning in life, and moreover is free and empowered to do so (Slaby, 2010). 
 Such insights brings us to the second key value of boredom in the literature: creativity. One 
can find many testimonials from geniuses attesting to the generative power of boredom. For instance, 
Nietzsche (1882, p.108) wrote that great artists ‘require a lot of boredom if their work is to succeed. 
For thinkers and all sensitive spirits, boredom is that disagreeable ‘windless calm’ of the soul that 
precedes a happy voyage and cheerful winds. They have to bear it and must wait for its effect on 
them.’ Similarly, Kets de Vries (2014) argued that boredom played a crucial role in many great 
artistic and scientific breakthroughs: Decartes allegedly ‘discovered’ the notions of x and y while 
idling in bed watching a fly on the ceiling, while Einstein reportedly achieved his initial pivotal 
insight into the nature of relativity while abstractly daydreaming. Thus, as Stern (1988) puts it, the 
‘heavy-gaited time’ (p.5) of monotony and boredom serves as a gestational space, and finally as a 
‘reluctant but nevertheless urgent passageway to creativity’ (p.11). Such anecdotes have been 
corroborated by recent research. For instance, Gasper and Middlewood (2014) and Mann and Cadman 
(2014) found that participants induced into a state of boredom performed far better on creativity tests 
(e.g., thinking of novel uses for plastic cups) than people who were either elated, relaxed or distressed. 
One explanation given was that boredom allowed attention to wander, and the mind to free-associate, 
thus facilitating creativity. Indeed, from a neurophysiological perspective, boredom may activate the 
default mode network (Raichle et al., 2001), which is thought to play a key role in creativity (e.g., 
stimulus independent thought) (Takeuchi et al., 2012).  
 Finally, and perhaps most dauntingly but also most transformatively, boredom can be a means 
of self-exploration, of coming face-to-face with oneself. This brings us back to meditation, and to 
Pirsig’s (1974) point that ‘in the very center of this boredom is the very thing Zen Buddhism seeks to 
teach’ (p.317). Zen is generally regarded to have begun with the Indian monk Bodhidharma, who 
brought Buddhism to China in 520 A.D. (Watts, 1957). According to semi-historical legend, upon 
arrival in China, he failed to initially be well-received, and thereafter retreated to a cave and spent 
nine years meditating facing its wall. Such was his subsequent influence that wall-facing became the 
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dominant form of meditation in Zen (Senauke, 2006). The contemporary teacher Osho (2015) freely 
acknowledges that this activity is perhaps the very epitome of boredom. However, Eastern traditions 
have an interesting explanation for this boredom: at its core, it is the result of psychological tension 
that arises if people are uncomfortable being alone with themselves. As such, it is suggested that 
many people seek company or distraction to avoid this type of uncomfortable self-encounter (Pezeu-
Massabuau, 2013). However, Buddhist theory holds that if one can tolerate and push on through this 
boredom and discomfort, one is able to gain vital insights into one’s mind and self-identity (Biceaga, 
2006). From a psychological growth perspective, such experiential insights can potentially be 
liberating and transformative; as Osho puts it,  ‘Watching the wall – slowly, slowly thoughts 
disappear, thinking stops, mind evaporates and what is left is your authentic reality’ (p.486). 
 So, as can be seen, although boredom has tended to be conceptualised as a negative state, 
there are valid reasons to suppose that it may potentially be of some value. The current study, then, is 
an exploratory investigation of boredom, aimed at enquiring into its nature and understanding any 
positive experiential elements. To do this, the study uses the relatively unconventional method of 
phenomenological introspection. Introspection was a much valued methodology in the early years of 
psychology, pioneered by phenomenological philosophers like Edmund Husserl (1931). Indeed, 
William James (1890, p.185) wrote that ‘Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on first 
and foremost and always.’ The technique fell out of favour due to numerous factors, from the 
dominance of Skinner’s (1938) behaviourism in the first half of the 20th century, to the critique of 
self-knowledge and agency provided by post-constructionist theories of identity in the latter half (e.g., 
Gergen, 1985). However, in recent years, the value of phenomenology has once again been 
recognised, most prominently within consciousness studies with the emergence of Varela’s (1996) 
neurophenomenology paradigm. As outlined in Varela and Shear’s (1999) edited book The View  from 
Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness, first-person reports of subjectivity 
have an invaluable (and indeed irreplaceable) role in furthering our understanding of psychological 
processes and experience. As such, this study brings the introspective phenomenological method to 
bear on the experience of boredom, with the aim of enquiring whether boredom may contain value or 
uses that are not readily apparent in conventional (i.e., negative) appraisals of this state. 
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Method 
Overview 
Introspective phenomenology is a form of empiricism which involves observing and reporting on 
one’s own subjectivity with as much accuracy as possible. As Sinnott-Armstrong (2008, p.85) puts it, 
‘The method is simple: describe the phenomena. More precisely: introspect on your own experience 
and then describe what it is like to have certain kinds of experience.’ The method can arguably be 
situated within the broader emergent paradigm of auto-ethnography (Denzin, 2013), being 
distinguished in particular by efforts to engage with one’s current subjective experience. For this 
study, conditions were established in which I would experience boredom for an hour, specifically, in 
the middle of a 13 hour airplane flight. (Given the nature of the project, the first person voice will be 
used from here on in.) I recorded my experiences in real time using an adaption of Csikszentmihalyi 
and Larson’s (1987) Experiencing Sampling Method. The recorded data were explored for thematic 
content, and analysed using an adaptation of Smith’s (1996) Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis. 
Participant 
Reflexivity is important in qualitative research, since the personal background and qualities of the 
researcher impact upon the research at all stages of the process, including serving as the ‘filter of 
salience through which data are sieved’ (Schreiber, 2001, p.60). As such, it is worth mentioning a few 
salient details about myself here that are relevant to the study. (That said, I shall keep this brief, for 
reasons given in the discussion.) I am a 36 year old lecturer in psychology. I was born in London into 
to a very loving middle class family (although my parents, both teachers, have a working class 
background), with one brother and sister. I did well academically at school, despite it being a rough 
place, and spent much of my time playing music and football. Before university I taught English for 
six months in China, and returned the following year to visit Tibet; it was there I became interested in 
Buddhism, and have tried ever since (with varying success) to maintain a regular meditation practice. 
I moved up to Edinburgh to study psychology, and stayed there for nine years. I spent five years in a 
touring and recording band while also working as a psychiatric nursing assistant. I moved back to 
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London in 2008 to undertake a PhD, studying the impact of meditation on mental health, and took up 
a position as a lecturer at a university in London in 2013.  
Data collection 
The intention was to gather real-time data on my own subjective experience of boredom. The data 
collection method was an adaption of Csikszentmihalyi and Larson’s (1987) Experiencing Sampling 
Method (ESM). Standard ESM protocol involves participants being contacted at various intervals 
(e.g., via pager), at which point they are asked to self-rate current experience (e.g., in terms of affect). 
The variation pioneered in the current study might be termed the ‘micro-experience auto-sampling 
method’ (MEASM). It is micro because it covers a relatively short period of time (one hour in this 
case). It is auto in two respects: (a) it is autonomous, in that the data was elicited and recorded by 
myself, rather than at the prompting of an independent researcher; and (b) it is automatic, in that the 
prompts were regulated by a set timer (in this case, setting my phone to alert me, via a vibration, 
every 60 seconds).  
The specific details of the data collection are as follows. A period of time was selected in 
which I was likely to be bored. The occasion selected was a 13 hour flight (leaving Singapore at 7am, 
bound for London). I selected the mid-point of the flight (i.e., after six hours) as the hour in which 
data collection would occur. This was chosen as an ideal situation for boredom, given, (a) flights are 
generally regarded as somewhat boring; (b) after six hours, I was already likely to be bored; (c) 
limited opportunities for movement (none in fact occurred during the hour); (d) limited opportunities 
for interaction (none in fact occurred during the hour); and (e) a relatively unchanging visual scene 
(window blinds were purposefully kept closed, and my entertainment screen turned off). Moreover, 
prior to the data collection hour, I specifically sought to ensure that I would already be in a state of 
boredom. For the first four hours of the flight, I watched two films (The Usual Suspects, and 
American Beauty), both of which I like but had seen at least twice before. I then spent two hours 
doing nothing (i.e., not entertaining myself in any way, and also not specifically trying to meditate or 
engage in interesting mental activities), to further foster a state of boredom. For the data collection 
hour itself, I sat comfortably in my chair and set my phone to vibrate every 60 seconds. At each 60-
second prompting, I quickly wrote a note [a few words] on my laptop, simply recording what I was 
Running head: A MEDITATION ON BOREDOM 
12 
 
thinking, feeling or experiencing at that particular moment. Immediately at the end of the hour, I then 
expanded each note into a full sentence, drawing on my still-fresh memory to provide slightly more 
detail and context to each note. 
Data analysis 
The data analysis method was a variation on Smith’s (1996) Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA). Standard IPA protocol was developed for the analysis of one-to-one interviews of a 
small group of participants who are ‘homogenous’ in some way. However, recent years have seen 
adaptations to suit various methodological contexts, e.g., focus groups (Palmer et al., 2010). IPA 
usually aims towards moving from the particular (i.e., one person’s experiences) to the shared (i.e., 
experiences people have in common). However, in the current study, the aim was to explore the 
particular in some depth through a sustained exercise in introspection, thereby providing a case study 
of boredom. In other respects, however, the protocol of IPA was followed, i.e., moving from the 
descriptive to the interpretative via a process of close line-by-line coding followed by identification of 
emergent themes.  
               The data analysis occurred immediately after the data collection hour. The raw data were the 
60 notes I had made during the hour (one per minute). Thus, the first stage of the analysis was the 
process of expanding these notes into whole sentences, as indicated above, which took about 10 
minutes. I then moved into the initial coding stage, in which I sought to identify up to three themes for 
each of the 60 entries (with an ‘entry’ consisting of the original note, plus the expanded sentence). In 
doing so, since the experience was still fresh in my mind, I was able to move from description to 
interpretation by drawing on memories and reflections of the hour itself, thereby substantiating and 
fleshing out the recorded notes. This coding process generated 82 separate themes (some shared by 
more than one entry). Next, I looked for emergent patterns of commonality by grouping the themes 
into categories based on conceptual similarity, which generated 20 categories. The categories were 
themselves then grouped into five meta-categories, again based on conceptual similarity: Time; 
World; Subjectivity; Self/Identity; and Project. 
Results 
Running head: A MEDITATION ON BOREDOM 
13 
 
The data collection hour generated 60 separate initial notes (one per minute), as detailed below 
verbatim in table 1. The expanded sentences based on the notes (written immediately after the hour) 
are included in the third column. 
 
Minute Verbatim note Expanded sentence 
1 why do this, futile Question futility of exercise 
2 thinking of items! pressure Wonder about pressure to write one item per minute 
3 fast min Surprised by speed of the previous minute 
4 dirty screen Notice computer screen needs cleaning 
5 blank, fuzzy mind No thoughts in mind – head fuzzy 
6 weird screen pattern Notice unusual pattern in background to computer screen 
7 sound stream wash over Feel like I’m in a stream of sounds, washing over me 
8 suites? etym. Wonder about etymology of word ‘suites’ 
9 knot – me, self? Identify my ‘sense of self’ with a psychological ‘knot’ 
behind my forehead 
10 quiet – nice!  Pleasant moment of silence 
11 lipread aisle man  Try to lipread conversation of man standing in the aisle 
12 plastic - inventor?  Wonder about who invented plastic 
13 sudden breath – odd  Sharp intake of breath highlights the irregularity of my 
breathing 
14 shoulder – old emo hurt? Wonder whether tension in shoulder is an old emotional 
wound 
15 nice water, thanks Gratefully accept a glass of water 
16 tired, seeing nothing Feel like I’ve exhausted my observational powers 
17 child sound like bird Think that child in front sounds like a bird when she talks 
18 untie knot in mind Return to psychological ‘knot,’ and try to untie it mentally 
19 eyes dart – look for interest Feel my eyes darting around to find something of interest 
in environment 
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20 eyes to window. free? Head turns involuntarily towards window; wonder about 
free will 
21 time gone – sad at time passing A sudden sadness at 20 minutes of my life having 
evaporated 
22 blue light trance  Hypnotically drawn to blue light on cabin ceiling up 
ahead 
23 time waste Condemn this whole project as a waste of time, and 
unusable 
24 words elusive Finding that appropriate descriptive words are 
increasingly elusive 
25 emails! anxious, chest A flutter of anxiety in chest about returning to work 
emails 
26 thoughts – come from?  Wonder how thoughts are being formed, and by who 
27 mind = ocean, looking for fish  Feel like I’m peering into the ocean, waiting for fish 
(thoughts) to pop to the surface 
28 want choc van ice  Craving for chocolate and vanilla ice cream 
29 blinking = weird, nice  Think that blinking is an odd bodily activity, but pleasant 
30 shins tingle  Tingling sensation in my shins 
31 words like centipede chasing  Think that words on screen look like little centipedes 
chasing each other 
32 thick tongue – want to poke  Tongue feels saturated – an urge to poke it out 
33 clearing, no thought  A clearing, without thoughts 
34 feeling endurance, keep at it  A feeling of endurance, like I could stick at this 
35 time quick, surprise  Surprised at the relative speed of the exercise 
36 my bonnie  The tune ‘My bonnie’ darts into my mind 
37 ossle ossle  Some of its lyrics morph into nonsense syllables (“ossle 
ossle”) 
38 sunshine field at home – urge to run Sudden urge to sprint across a field (behind my parents’ 
house) in the sunshine 
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39 nice fest, happy  A happy memory of being at a music festival 
40 uniforms – pretty Admire ornate uniforms of cabin staff 
41 bad election, annoyed  Bitterness at recent UK elections 
42 red dungarees  Recall a pair of red corduroy dungarees I wore as a child 
43 old and sad  Feel old, and a bit despondent 
44 knot tight  Throbbing sensation in forehead – the knot tightening? 
45 eyes closing – drowsy  Eyes close involuntarily; wave of drowsiness 
46 time stopped  Feel that time hasn’t moved at all (despite clock changing) 
47 crew at curtain – clumsy magic  Flight attendant emerges suddenly from behind curtain, 
like a clumsy magician 
48 slow thoughts, all incomplete  Thoughts slowing down, and emerging half finished 
49 knot again – Nietz recur  
 
A recurrence of the knot – a sense of ‘eternal recurrence’ 
(Nietzsche) 
50 Nietz like koan – mystery  Think Nietzsche sounds like a Zen koan, and equally 
mysterious 
51 me a ball on hill  Feel like I’m a ball, bobbling haphazardly down a gentle, 
bumpy, never-ending hill 
52 vertigo, not just plane  A sudden vertigo, not related to being on a plane 
53 silly task – me too!  Find myself quite preposterous for doing this 
54 no blame  Admitting stupidity seems to absolve me of responsibility 
55 peace, happy  Feeling quite peaceful, happy even 
56 I don’t matter – fine My own insignificance strikes me as a relief 
57 nearly done, free  Quite liberated at the thought of nearly finishing the hour 
58 full? empty? strange  A strange sensation of being both fuller and emptier than 
when the hour began 
59 hopeful future – mix of images A sense of hopefulness about the future (arising from 
relatively inconsequential images) 
60 nice unusual hour  Grateful for spending the hour in this unusual way 
 
Table 1: Results from the data collection hour.  
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These entries were coded thematically, and grouped into categories and meta-categories. The themes, 
categories and meta-categories are shown in table 2 below, together with the specific entries 
associated with each theme. 
 
Meta-category Category Theme Entry 
Time Perception Shifting time perceptions 3, 35 
  Time quickening 3, 35, 52 
  Time slowing 46 
  Strangeness of passage of time 42, 46 
 Usage Time well spent 57, 60 
  Time as a resource 60 
 Existential  Life passing quickly 21, 39, 43, 52 
 reflection Preciousness of time 21 
  Make the most of time 21, 39 
  Nostalgia 39, 43 
  Sadness at time passing 43 
World Attentiveness Noticing new features  4, 6, 22 
  Surprise at surroundings 4, 47 
  Perception/appreciation of detail 6, 24 
  Attention ‘ensnared/captured’ 20, 40 
  Lack of attentiveness 16 
  Epistemic hunger 19 
 Altered  Aesthetic appreciation 6, 22, 40 
 relationship Perceptual shifts 7, 31, 47, 51 
  Immersion in world 7 
  Transience/impermanence 7  
  Curiosity about phenomena 8, 11, 12, 50 
  De-familiarisation (see old as new) 8, 12, 17, 31 
 Engagement Yearning for activity 38, 59 
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  Yearning to explore world 38, 39, 57, 59 
  Sense of possibility 39, 52, 57 
  Intentions for future activities 4, 34 
  Probing the world 12, 19 
  Receiving goods 15 
 People Attention to people 11, 15, 17, 40, 47 
  Care/regard for others 11 
 Broader  Reflection on events 41 
 concerns Worry/concern about life 25, 41 
Subjectivity Embodiment Somatisation of emotions 25 
  Unfamiliarity with body 13, 14, 30, 32 
  Involuntary nature of bodily processes 13, 32 
  Getting to know body 30 
  Sensations in head 5, 9 
  Vivid memory 28, 38, 39, 42 
 Mental  Slipperiness of mind 37 
 strangeness De-familiarisation of internal world 29, 30, 32 
  Mind as sea of potentials  27 
  Content emerging unbidden 26, 27, 36, 41, 58, 60 
  Sudden (involuntary?) shifts in attention 13, 20, 22, 44 
  Strangeness of internal world 26, 29 
 Clearing Internal space 10, 33,  
  Mental quietude 5, 10, 33 
  Calmness 10, 33,  
  Lightness 56 
 Creativity Creative imagination 31, 37, 59 
  Free-associating (creativity/play) 8, 17, 36, 37, 47, 50, 60 
 Positivity Happiness 55, 56 
  Freedom 56 
  Delight/pleasure 28 
Running head: A MEDITATION ON BOREDOM 
18 
 
  Pleasant sensation 29, 30 
  Gratitude 15 
  Desire 28 
 Negativity Mind drowsy/sluggish 45, 48 
  Mental fuzziness 5 
  Bodily discomfort 14, 18, 49 
  Boredom 16 
  Negative cognitions 25 
Self/identity Awareness Witnessing consciousness 27, 44, 58 
  Self-consciousness 53, 55 
  Insignificance of self 55, 56 
 Aspects of Emptiness of self 58 
 self Plenitude of self 58 
  Probing self/identity 9, 14, 18, 20, 26, 42, 44, 
49 
  Lack of volitional control 36, 45, 51 
 Creation of  Linked to mental tension (knot) 9, 18, 44, 49 
 identity Self-as-repetition 49 
  Sense of personal history/journey 14, 39, 42, 51 
Project Concerns Doubt about value of project 1, 23, 53, 54 
  Doubts about own ability 2, 16, 23, 24, 53, 55 
  Exercise feels contrived 2 
 Difficulties Ineffability of experience 23, 24, 48, 50 
  Exercise feels unfamiliar 1 
  Strangeness of activity 46 
 Positives Appreciating activity 34, 57 
  Enjoying activity 34, 35, 54, 57 
  Flow 54, 55 
 
Table 2: Themes, categories and meta-categories from the data collection hour. 
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Analysis and Discussion 
The results offer a revealing insight into the phenomenology of boredom, showing this to potentially 
be a rich and dynamic state, full of value and possibility. Of course, there are the obvious caveats, 
such as the impossibility of generalising from this one intensive observation by one person to all other 
people and contexts, as discussed further below. Nevertheless, as a sustained introspective exercise, 
the results offer a unique case study of the kaleidoscopic nuances of boredom; it can be seen, in this 
case at least, that boredom is not necessarily the dull, valueless state that it is commonly taken to be, 
but can facilitate a fascinating array of experiences and insights. The hour yielded positive or 
intriguing moments relating to two of the three main sources of value outlined above – altered 
perception of time, and exploration of self – with an additional boon not previously identified, 
namely, curiosity regarding the external world. There were some experiences pertaining to the third 
main strand above, namely creativity, such as the generation of novel mental data through free 
association. In general though, there did not appear to be many moments of creativity per se. 
However, this is not especially surprising: in the literature, boredom is often presented as a prelude to 
creativity, a germinal state in which new associations are perhaps being made below the surface of 
awareness, which then burst forth after the period of boredom (Mann & Cadman, 2014). Thus, the 
three main sources of value were: (a) altered time perception; (b) environmental curiosity; and (c) 
exploration of self. These shall be outlined below. 
 However, before discussing the phenomenology of boredom in this instance, it is worth re-
iterating one key point: I truly was bored! That is, as I began to engage with the exercise (i.e., at the 
beginning of the hour), I was in the midst of an on-going state that I would have no hesitation in 
describing as ‘boredom.’ Or more specifically, I was experiencing what could be called ‘situational’ 
(Toohey, 2011) or ‘state’ boredom (Fahlman et al., 2013), characterised by lack of interest in my 
current environment, comprising elements like restlessness combined with tiredness, disengagement, 
and inattentiveness, all of which are factors of Fahlman et al.’s (2013) Multidimensional State 
Boredom Scale. However, following the advice of Brodsky (1997), rather than seeking to escape or 
distract myself from the boredom – as I and others might normally do – I tried to enter deep into it, to 
really probe and explore it. In doing so, the experience started to change; I might still have plausibly 
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and legitimately described the hour as ‘boring,’ yet at the same time it began to become vibrant and 
interesting, full of mystery and depth. Whether it then still truly ‘counts’ as boredom is a fascinating 
question, and one which highlights the limitations of language in capturing the ineffable nuances of 
experience (Brockmeier, 2002). Indeed, this question actually highlights the shape-shifting nature of 
emotional and experiential categories, showing that if an experience such as boredom is fully 
embraced, it may no longer be boring per se. It is this same rationale that underpins mindfulness-
based interventions, which are based on the premise that if dysphoric states like anxiety are engaged 
with in a particular spirit (e.g., open, curious, kind, and non-judgmental), then these states become 
somehow transmuted into less noxious or threatening versions, and perhaps even dissipate entirely 
(Kabat-Zinn, 2003). 
 The first emergent meta-theme was altered time perception. A slowing or lengthening of 
subjective time is one of archetypal features of boredom, identified theoretically by philosophers such 
as Heidegger (1938), and corroborated in empirical experiments (e.g., Watt, 1991). However, in the 
current study, there was a strange sense of time both slowing and quickening: at points (e.g., min. 46) 
time felt almost static, yet at other moments (e.g., mins. 3, 35, & 52) I was surprised by the swiftness 
of the preceding minute, with a sensation of time slipping away through my fingers. Perhaps such 
juxtapositions are not so unfamiliar; as Roeckelein (2008) elucidates, the elusive, paradoxical nature 
of time has been recognised at least as far back as the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (circa 490-430 
B.C.). It has been argued that eventful (i.e., interesting) experiences seem to pass quickly at the time, 
but seem lengthy in retrospect (due to the formation of substantive and varied memories), while 
uneventful (i.e., boring) experiences pass slowly, but seem short afterwards (due to a lack of discrete 
memorable components) (Hammond, 2012). However, in the current study, sensations of time 
quickening and slowing appeared to alternate and even co-exist; indeed, an overriding feeling was 
simply of the strangeness of time, once observed up close.  
Added to this strangeness was a strong, melancholic awareness of time as a precious resource 
that was fast depleting, as capture in minute 21. This in turn evoked a range of emotions, from 
nostalgia for time gone by, to an urgent wish to ‘make the most’ of future time. For instance, in 
minute 42, I recalled a pair of red trousers I used to wear as a child (which are vivid to me still, as 
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there is a photo of me wearing them, in which I just look completely happy); this memory led 
inexorably, in the next minute, to a sense of sadness at growing old. However, this melancholy train 
of thought then seemed to dissipate, and by the closing of the hour (e.g., minute 59), I was feeling 
rather more hopeful about life, and about the time that still lies ahead of me. Arguably these varied 
reflections corroborate Heidegger’s point about the value of boredom as an embodied experience of 
time itself, generating vital existential insights, such as the need to act and seize the day before it 
passes (Slaby, 2010). 
 The second meta-theme was curiosity regarding my surroundings, both proximally (i.e., the 
aircraft cabin) and more distally (the world ‘generally’). Usually, lack of interest in one’s environment 
is a defining feature of boredom as conventionally understood (Fisherl, 1993). Indeed, I myself felt 
disengaged and inattentive at the beginning of the introspective hour (having deliberately induced 
boredom). However, as the hour proceeded, I noticed an unusual phenomenon. I had previously 
judged my surroundings as devoid of interest, hence boring. Normally, this would be the cue to seek 
alternative surroundings, or at least to distract myself. By removing these options though, I began to 
find value in stimuli that I had previously judged as lacking. I found myself noticing new features of 
my environment I had previously overlooked, and indeed appreciating these aesthetically (mins. 4, 6, 
22, 40); moreover, stimuli I had become habituated to became ‘de-familiarised,’ i.e., seeming new and 
strange. For instance, I became mesmerised at one point (minute 40) by the beautifully ornate patterns 
on the uniforms of the cabin crew, which is certainly not something I have ever paused to appreciate 
or even notice previously. These experiences reflect a passage in Pirsig (1974), in which he describes 
people in the prairies noticing subtle phenomena that might be overlooked by people caught up in the 
sensory overload of the city, quiet moments of beauty that ‘can be noticed because other things are 
absent’ (p.24). In cognitive/epistemic terms, attention is often drawn to phenomena that are novel, 
salient, or urgent (Posner & Petersen, 1990). Phenomena that lack these qualities are thus often judged 
as lacking interest. But, if attention is compelled to stay with such phenomena, it is as if the mind 
finds ways to make these novel or salient. An example of this is the ‘mindfulness of breathing,’ a 
meditation practice focusing on the breath. Usually, one might take one’s breathing for granted, or see 
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it as lacking interest. However, practitioners report that, once engaged with, the breath can become a 
source of great fascination, possessing subtle depths and nuances (Kapleau, 1965). 
 This last point brings us to our final meta-theme, exploration of the self (comprising both 
subjectivity and self/identity in the results table). Here we return to the idea that boredom brings us 
face-to-face with ourselves. As Stern (1988, p.5) puts it, boredom is a ‘void [that] becomes a vital 
capability, [one that] confronts the question of “Who am I?”.’ Indeed, in Zen, the rigours of wall 
sitting meditation are designed to encourage/compel practitioners to ‘push through’ boredom and to 
interrogate their identity (Watts, 1957). Essentially, the aim of Zen meditation is for people to realise 
that their ‘ego’ (their conventional identity) is an ‘illusion’ (an on-going project of construction), and 
instead to experience the liberation of not ‘having’ an ego per se (Kapleau, 1965). During my 
introspection, I cannot claim to have had any such insights. However, I did certainly journey ‘into 
myself,’ exploring unfamiliar aspects of my being, and becoming attentive to my mental dynamics. 
For instance, there was a recurrent observation of a sensation of a ‘knot’ behind my forehead (minutes 
9, 18, 44 and 49). This observation occurred in conjunction with a feeling that my sense of identity 
was somehow bound up with this sensation, as if, were the sensation to dissipate, so might my sense 
of self.  
Similarly, I noticed the way that thoughts appeared to emerge unbidden (i.e., without me 
volitionally ‘thinking’ them), as in minute 26. While such observations are common currency in 
Buddhist theory – indeed, the title of a prominent book on Buddhism and psychotherapy is Thoughts 
without a Thinker (Epstein, 2004) – it was interesting to notice this for myself. However, this does 
raise the question as to whether my prior reading of Buddhism influenced my interpretation of minute 
26 – i.e., was I primed to feel as if thoughts were arising unbidden due to my exposure to a philosophy 
that explicitly conceptualises thoughts thus?. More generally, I was intrigued by how slippery, elusive 
and strange the mind was, a fleeting dance of vague ephemera; not for nothing did William James 
(1890) famously refer to consciousness as a ‘stream.’ Indeed, I was particularly captivated by a meta-
image that occurred to me in minute 27 – i.e., an image about the nature of mind itself, and about the 
nature of the introspective activity I was engaged in. In particular, I felt that the process was much 
like peering into an ocean, and waiting for fish (i.e., thoughts) to appear. In retrospect, this image does 
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indeed capture my feelings about the exercise, and the mind generally, quite effectively. I also found 
that my sphere of subjectivity appeared to widen, encompassing more phenomenological ‘terrain.’ For 
instance, I often tend to live ‘in my head,’ i.e., wrapped up in discursive thoughts, and am rather 
inattentive to my embodied experience. However, here I enjoyed the sensation of exploring the 
subjectivity of my body (e.g., minutes 29, 30 and 32), corroborating studies that have linked enhanced 
body awareness to wellbeing (Brani et al., 2014). That said, it wasn’t an unmitigated enjoyment; both 
minutes 29 and 32 felt ‘weird,’ in that I was acutely aware of the sheer fact of my physical being, 
which evoked subsequent parallels in my mind with the sensation of ‘nausea’ described by Sartre 
(1938). 
So, in all, I encountered a range of absorbing experiences during the hour. As I will suggest 
below, such empirical data have the potential to facilitate a re-appraisal of boredom, showing that it is 
not necessarily the dysphoric state it is usually conceived as being, but has the potential to also be of 
some psychological value. Before making this claim, however, I must introduce the inevitable caveat 
regarding the generalisability of the data. Firstly, the design of the study, and in particular the decision 
to elicit an observation every 60 seconds, inevitably influenced the nature of the data collected. In 
practice, this period of time actually felt very brief, and therefore the prompts were experienced as 
somewhat intrusive. Indeed, two of my first three observations (minutes 2 and 3) related specifically 
to the pressure I felt relating to the need to note down observations so frequently. Moreover, this 
design structure arguably impacted on the nature of the observations, in a number of ways. Firstly, 
one might argue that the rapidity of the observation sequence impeded the chance for boredom to 
truly ‘set in.’ There was roughly only 50 seconds between completing my note for a given minute and 
being prompted for my note for the subsequent minute. Moreover, given that I knew in advance how 
soon my next observation would be prompted, in the seconds leading up to the prompt I often found 
myself already composing the notes I would write when prompted. This latter point was exacerbated 
by my knowledge that I would seek to report and publish my observations, which perhaps created a 
certain pressure to make them interesting or noteworthy. As such, it could be said that I was actually 
task-focused for much of the time, rather than actually allowing myself to be bored. Given these 
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points, I have some suggestions below for how future research in this area might remedy these 
limitations. 
A second point regarding the generalisability of the data is the fact that this is just one 
person’s experience of boredom on one occasion. Reflexivity demands that I acknowledge the data as 
necessarily particular, determined by my own history and characteristics. To this extent, I have tried 
to give some brief indications of how my personal history may have shaped the ‘filter of salience’ 
through which the data were sieved (Schreiber, 2001, p.60), such as my familiarity with meditation 
(discussed further below), and my prior familiarity with Buddhist theory (mentioned above). 
However, I am wary about focusing overly on my personal characteristics. This study is a 
phenomenology of boredom, not of me, and there is a risk that excessive reflexivity turns into a form 
of ‘epistemological narcissism,’ in which researchers are more concerned with accounting for 
themselves than their data (Cutcliffe, 2003). Moreover, there are limits to reflexivity: even the 
lengthiest autobiographies fail to capture the near-infinity of stories and experiences that constitute a 
person. Moreover, as psychoanalytic theory has recognised, there is so much about the person that is 
hidden to themselves (Luft, 1969); thus, the idea that I can ever fully ‘account for’ myself, let alone 
within the confines of a short academic paper, is something of an impossibility. In any case, the study 
is not about ‘proving’ that boredom can be a valuable experience for everybody all of the time. No 
doubt there are many people who experience severe boredom, such as isolated older adults (Gabriel & 
Bowling, 2004), and need genuine assistance to find engaging activities and relationships to alleviate 
its burden. Rather, this is simply a case study to suggest that boredom has the potential at least to not 
be an entirely negative and unfulfilling state of mind. 
That being said, it could also be argued that my ‘ability’ to engage with boredom, and to find 
interest in it, was due to my experience as a practising meditator, as well as to the possibility that I 
was motivated to make the experience interesting. Indeed, it could even be suggested that, during the 
activity, I was actually meditating (i.e., trying to observe my internal world with non-judgemental 
curiosity), rather than being bored. However, this latter reflection is precisely the point of this paper, 
with its aim of ‘reappraising’ boredom. As Biceaga (2006) argues, perhaps meditation is boredom, 
and boredom is meditation? The only difference between the two then is that boredom is 
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conventionally appraised as negative (and hence people tend to denigrate or devalue it), whereas 
meditation is usually regarded as a worthwhile and beneficial mental activity (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). 
Consequently, if people were able to regard their boredom as a meditative experience, it may no 
longer be appraised as negative; indeed, it may no longer even be boring – as I found during the hour, 
the boredom became interesting!  
These kinds of reappraisals have relevance for fields such as positive psychology (PP), which 
are concerned with wellbeing and flourishing (Lomas et al., 2014). PP initially appeared to make a 
distinction between mental states that were ‘positive’ (e.g., optimism) and those that were ‘negative’ 
(e.g., anxiety). It furthermore often implied that the former were necessarily good, and should be 
sought, whereas the latter were intrinsically bad, and should be eschewed. However, in recent years, a 
‘second wave’ of the field has been emerging (Held, 2004; Wong, 2011; Lomas & Ivtzan, 2015), in 
which it is recognised that: (a) ostensibly positive states can be detrimental to wellbeing in certain 
circumstances, e.g., ‘excessive optimism’ is linked to health risk behaviours (Weinstein, 1987); (b) 
apparently negative states can sometimes be conducive to flourishing, e.g., anxiety can alert us to 
potential threats, and encourage pro-active coping (Norem, 2001); and, (c) many desirable states (e.g., 
love) are actually ‘co-valenced,’ involving a complex dialectical blend of light and dark elements 
(Lazarus, 2003). In this context, perhaps the current paper can contribute towards a re-appraisal of 
boredom, challenging the conventional view that it is necessarily ‘negative’ and devoid of value, and 
suggesting that it has the potential, if engaged with, to be a positive and rewarding experience.  
However, this potential needs further corroboration through future research, given the 
limitations of the current study, as outlined above. Based on these limitations, I would like to offer 
various recommendations for any such research into this topic. Firstly, in terms of generalisability, it 
will be helpful to recruit a broad range of participants, of varying age, gender, ethnicity, and 
educational level. Efforts could also be made to compare people with and without meditation 
experience, to explore the intriguing notion that meditators may have developed a particular ability or 
capacity to appreciate boredom. Secondly, in terms of the session itself, a longer time period than 1 
hour would ideally be allocated to allow boredom to truly manifest; indeed, researchers might try 
experimenting with different durations to compare their impact (e.g., 2 hours versus 1 whole day). 
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Thirdly, and similarly, it would be prudent to space the observation prompts further apart than 60 
seconds. As discussed above, in practice, this interval felt too short, and indeed intrusive, making the 
hour too ‘task-oriented.’ Gaps of 5 or even 10 minutes would be preferable in this regard. Moreover, 
researchers might give thought to spacing these intervals with a degree of randomness, e.g., giving the 
first prompt after 10 minutes, the second after 6 minutes, the third after 14 minutes, the fourth after 3 
minutes, and so on. This would prevent participants anticipating or waiting for a prompt (e.g., trying 
to guess when 5 minutes had lapsed, and preparing their observation in advance), as I did here. 
Fourth, to alleviate task demands, it would be better for participants to be able to verbally report their 
observations (via audio-recorder) rather than having to write these down.  
Finally, in terms of recruiting participants, it may be worth developing a protocol where the 
period of boredom appears to participants as merely accidental. This would help prevent participants 
realising that it was a study about boredom, a realisation which would, (a) reduce the likelihood of 
their participation in the first place, and (b) influence their responses. For instance, participants could 
ostensibly be recruited to an experiment which seems appealing and interesting, such as a flight 
simulation. Then, on arrival to the experiment, participants could simply be asked to sit alone in a 
waiting room, with no distractions. Once there, they might be warned that there might be a ‘bit of a 
wait,’ of up to two hours, say, before the experiment started. The researchers might then contrive 
some reason to intermittently check on the participants and enquire what they are thinking about. 
Obviously, this is just one suggestion, but arguably something akin to this might be needed to 
generate an ecologically valid situation of genuine boredom. If this is managed, then we shall get a 
better idea of whether boredom can indeed be a useful and valuable state, as this current paper has 
suggested.  
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